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Our intuition tells that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in C-619/18
P Commission v. Poland will rule against Poland. Although much depends on how
the Court will frame its decision, the experience teaches that the ruling alone will
not solve the problem of rule of law backsliding in the Member State concerned.
Rather, the infringement action concentrates on an isolated violation resulting from
a legal act that in practice is part of a wider project of the government targeting the
independence of the judiciary. Since it does not address the roots and the entirety of
the problem, it cannot be expected to restore the rule of law. This narrow approach
to rule of law backsliding – albeit safe in terms of legal grounds – does not address
its spill-over effects on fundamental rights and freedoms. One should not lose sight
of attacks on public watchdog organisations, such as the press or NGOs, academic
freedom and mass surveillance, just to name a few real-life examples from EU
Member States that accompany rule of law backsliding.
In this blog post we propose the CJEU to introduce “rule of law infringement
procedures”, having both a fast-track and a freezing component, as part of a wider
“EU rule of law toolbox”. Rule of law infringement procedures would not require
revisions of EU treaties, but more effective use of the existing legal and procedural
tools. Rule of law infringement procedures should be conducted by taking the
following five suggestions and warnings into account.
First, the European Commission should identify the rule of law problem explicitly.
Second, it should not waste time and postpone its legal actions, while a Member
State openly violates the rule of law. Third, the CJEU should automatically prioritise
and accelerate infringement cases with a rule of law element to avoid more
harm being done by those in power. Fourth, interim measures should be used
to put an immediate halt to rule of law violations that can culminate in grave and
irreversible harm. Fifth, EU institutions should establish a periodic rule of law review
to determine if there is a systemic threat to the rule of law in a given Member State
that would provide additional legitimacy to the European Commission for initiating
rule of law infringement actions and the CJEU ruling on such matters.
1.1 Calling a spade a spade
Our first proposition is that rule of law issues must be named as such.  When
targeting individual issues, it is more difficult to recognise the systemic attacks on
the rule of law. Therefore, the Commission should follow Scheppele’s suggestion
and bundle cases with similar root causes. Alternatively, the Member States should
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use direct actions against other Member States violating the rule of law along
Kochenov’s biting intergovernmentalism theory.
In view of the recent proactive role of the European Parliament in tackling rule of law
backsliding, the possibility of initiating legal proceedings in such cases might also be
granted to the only democratically elected EU institution. But even in the absence
of such an approach, the rule of law element, when present, should be expressly
acknowledged and accordingly tackled. The misconstruction of the Hungarian
judicial capture as a case of age discrimination serves as an illustration of the
mistake of not calling rule of law backsliding by its name.
1.2 No room for a discursive approach
Whatever procedure is followed to enforce the rule of law, there is no reason to
waste time by deliberation, debate, and discussion, once the problem areas have
been established in a thorough, contextual, qualitative analysis, along with objective
assessment, equal treatment of the countries and scientific rigour. The government
in question should be given time to present its arguments, but prolonged procedures
with extended deadlines after the previous ones have been ignored by a Member
State concerned do not make much sense.
As the application of the rule of law framework vis-à-vis Poland proved, there is no
reason to presume the good intentions of a power capturing state institutions to
engage in a sunshine approach involving a dialogue and soft measures.
1.3 Expedited rule of law procedures
Even if rule of law problems are addressed as such and the European Commission
takes legal action before a constitutional capture is completed, court proceedings are
often protracted. This is a major drawback given the gravity of the harm that can be
done to a legal system in a Member State, and by implication to the EU legal system.
Therefore, if the case reaches the judicial phase, the CJEU should automatically
take into account the gravity of the possible consequences of rule of law violations,
the scale of its effects, and the fact that time is on the side of those violating the rule
of law.
Once the constitution is rewritten, institutions that were supposed to serve as
checks on those in power are weakened and individuals loyal to the government
are appointed to key positions, it becomes extremely difficult to make a U-turn and
restore the rule of law, and even more challenging to explain the necessity of this
change to the people. There are also collateral issues. By the time the potentially
negative assessment is published, the state scrutinised might have changed its laws
or practices, and require another analysis and evaluation. The new laws adopted or
practices introduced may be equally substandard, and continue to harm the legal
system until yet another assessment becomes public.
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Accordingly, we propose to automatically accelerate the proceedings with a rule
of law element. Technically, such a process should be triggered if the Commission
invokes Article 2 TEU or at the minimum when Article 2 TEU in conjunction with
Article 19 TEU are jeopardized. This approach corresponds to the CJEU’s decision
in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, where, as Laurent Pech and
Sébastien Platon put it, “the Court essentially establishes a general obligation for
Member States to guarantee and respect the independence of their national courts
and tribunals”.
The Statute of the CJEU (in Article 23(a)) and the CJEU’s Rules of Procedure make
acceleration of court procedures possible. The expedited procedure for preliminary
rulings (Articles 105-6 Rules of Procedure), the expedited procedure for direct
actions (Articles 133-136 Rules of Procedure) and the urgent preliminary ruling
procedures in the area of freedom, security and justice (Articles 107-114 Rules of
Procedure) deserve attention. In addition, priority treatment (Article 53(3) Rules of
Procedure) may be granted to certain cases by the president of the Court if special
circumstances apply.
1.4 Interim measures
Typically, even a fast-track infringement procedure will not be prompt enough to
prevent the harm that rule of law violations may cause to a legal system. Therefore,
interim measures should be ordered in infringement procedures involving a rule of
law element.
An interim measure has been invoked in a recent infringement case, in the infamous
Bia#owie#a forest affair for logging trees at the UNESCO-protected NATURA 2000
site. In Bia#owie#a, pending the judgment in the main proceedings, the CJEU
ordered Poland to stop the logging. The Polish response was an intensified cutting
of trees, and additionally, the government even asked for the forest in question to be
removed from the UNESCO World Heritage List. In order to create more incentives
for Poland to follow the interim measure, the CJEU decided that penalty payments
would be imposed on Poland if the government failed to comply with the interim
measure immediately and fully. As Koncewicz argued, the case “shows that the
Treaties do contain legal tools to respond to the recalcitrant member states riding
roughshod over the core values and principles of the EU legal order”.
In order to prevent more harm being done to the rule of law, and in line with the
precautionary principle, we argue for interim measures suspending the given
national policies under the threat of dissuasive fines, putting a halt to rule of law
violations until corresponding cases are decided on their merits. The precautionary
principle is a policy-making strategy: whenever an activity might result in harm or
injustice, measures should be taken to prevent this, even if the exact effect of the
discussed steps on the possible harm are not fully established scientifically.
In Poland there are currently no domestic remedies that could be effectively used
to counteract unconstitutional laws, policies or practices. That is because the ruling
majority has captured a majority of judges on the Constitutional Tribunal, which, as
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 Sadurski put it, has turned into an ally of the government, while the constitutional
accountability of current officeholders remains out of the question for political
reasons (at least during this parliamentary term). Hence, all constitutionally dubious
legal acts – such as the amended Act on the National Council of the Judiciary, the
Act on the Supreme Court and the Act on the system of ordinary courts – enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and remain legally valid. While their legitimacy is
at the lowest ebb, they are part of binding law. As a result, they are followed and
abided by those who remain faithful to the rule of law (like some of the judges who
silently accepted their removal or requested the president of Poland to extend their
service). The remedy may thus only come from EU institutions.
As Koen Lenaerts, President of the CJEU noted: a failure to comply with the Court’s
decision would be a step towards secession from the EU. This would indeed serve
as evidence that the foundational values enshrined in Article 2 TEU are no longer
shared by Poland, but such a disregard is fatal also procedurally, as the EU thus far
has not tested any other tools (and Article 7 TEU is too burdensome) to prevent the
dismantling of the EU from within.
1.5 An EU mechanism to enforce the rule of law
When assessing whether a Member State is engaged in rule of law backsliding, the
judiciary is overburdened, whereas political institutions – because of the high political
threshold an Article 7 TEU procedure requires – escape responsibility in enforcing
common values altogether. Therefore, an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule
of law and fundamental rights (DRF monitoring and enforcement mechanism) – as
proposed by the European Parliament and earlier by one of us – should be brought
to life. A regular, possibly annual supervisory mechanism, based on a contextual
analysis of national laws and policies, a scientifically proven methodology, objective
standards and equal treatment of Member States, should be established.
With such a mechanism in place, the EU could warn the respective Member State in
due time and request a return to these values. Also, if a Member State has already
breached these values, EU institutions would not have to wait for external actors (like
the European Court of Human Rights or the Venice Commission) to indicate generic
problems with the rule of law but could use their own scoreboard system.
In mutual recognition cases, scholars like Carrera and Mitsilegas pushed for a
freezing mechanism and indeed in C-404/15 Aranyosi and C#ld#raru and C-216/18
PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (also known as the Celmer affaire,
exhaustedly debated on Verfassungsblog) the CJEU allowed and even obliged
national executing courts to suspend surrender, until the potential human rights
violations in the issuing state are confirmed or rebutted. So as not to overburden the
judiciary, Bárd and van Ballegooij went one step further and argued that surrender
cases should be frozen by the national courts, “awaiting a resolution of the matter
from political actors in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU
or the DRF monitoring and enforcement mechanism called for by the European
Parliament”.
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The rule of law mechanism could indicate when to start rule of law infringement
procedures or whether it is necessary to request interim measures. Furthermore, it
would allow the EU to act promptly and suspend the application of EU laws based on
mutual recognition, and thus relieve courts of this burden. It could also indicate when
mutual trust can be re-established instead of leaving to the judiciary case-by-case
decisions on this matter.
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